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Abstract—The principle of compressed sensing (CS) can be
applied in a cryptosystem by providing the notion of security.
In information-theoretic sense, it is known that a CS-based
cryptosystem can be perfectly secure if it employs a random
Gaussian sensing matrix updated at each encryption and its
plaintext has constant energy. In this paper, we propose a new
CS-based cryptosystem that employs a secret bipolar keystream
and a public unitary matrix, which can be suitable for practical
implementation by generating and renewing the keystream in
a fast and efficient manner. We demonstrate that the sensing
matrix is asymptotically Gaussian for a sufficiently large plaintext
length, which guarantees a reliable CS decryption for a legitimate
recipient. By means of probability metrics, we also show that
the new CS-based cryptosystem can have the indistinguishability
against an adversary, as long as the keystream is updated at
each encryption and each plaintext has constant energy. Finally,
we investigate how much the security of the new CS-based
cryptosystem is sensitive to energy variation of plaintexts.
Index Terms—Compressed encryption, Hellinger distance, in-
distinguishability, linear feedback shift register (LFSR), proba-
bility metrics, self-shrinking generators, total variation distance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Compressed sensing (CS) [1]−[3] is to recover a sparse
signal from the measurements that are believed to be in-
complete. A signal x ∈ RN is called K-sparse if it has at
most K-nonzero entries, where K ≪ N . A sparse signal is
linearly measured by y = Φx ∈ RM , where Φ is an M ×N
sensing matrix with M ≪ N . In CS theory, if Φ obeys the
restricted isometry property (RIP) [1][3], a stable and robust
reconstruction of x can be guaranteed from the incomplete
measurement y. The CS reconstruction is accomplished by
solving an l1-minimization problem with convex optimization
or greedy algorithms [4]. With efficient measurement and
stable reconstruction, the CS technique has been of interest in a
variety of research fields, e.g., communications [5]−[7], sensor
networks [8]−[10], image processing [11]−[13], radar [14],
etc.
The CS principle can be applied in a cryptosystem for
information security. A CS-based cryptosystem encrypts a
plaintext through a CS measurement process, where the sens-
ing matrix is kept secret. The ciphertext can then be decrypted
through a CS reconstruction process by a legitimate recipient
with the knowledge of the sensing matrix. In [15], Rachlin
and Baron proved that a CS-based cryptosystem cannot be
perfectly secure in itself, but might be computationally secure.
Orsdemir et al. [16] showed that it is computationally secure
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against a key search technique via an algebraic approach.
In [17], Bianchi et al. analyzed the security of a CS-based
cryptosystem employing a random Gaussian sensing matrix
updated at each encryption. Precisely, they showed that the
cryptosystem with the one-time sensing random Gaussian
matrix can be perfectly secure, as long as each plaintext
has constant energy. A similar analysis has been made for
a CS-based cryptosystem having a circulant sensing matrix
for efficient CS processes [18][19]. In [20] and [21], wireless
channel characteristics could be exploited for wireless security
of CS-based cryptosystems. The CS technique can also be
applied in database systems [22], where random noise has
been intentionally added to CS measurements for differential
privacy. In practice, a variety of CS-based cryptosystems
concerning the security of multimedia, imaging, and smart grid
data have been suggested in [23]−[29].
In this paper, we propose a new CS-based cryptosystem
that employs a secret bipolar keystream and a public unitary
matrix, which can be suitable for practical implementation by
generating and renewing the keystream at each encryption in
a fast and efficient manner. The keystream generator, based on
a linear feedback shift register (LFSR), plays a crucial role in
the efficient implementation. We demonstrate that the entries
of the sensing matrix are asymptotically Gaussian distributed if
the plaintext length is sufficiently large. With the sensing ma-
trix, it is obvious that the new CS-based cryptosystem, named
as the asymptotically Gaussian one-time sensing (AG-OTS)
cryptosystem, theoretically guarantees a stable and robust CS
decryption for a legitimate recipient.
For security analysis, we study the indistinguishability [30]
of the AG-OTS cryptosystem. The total variation (TV) dis-
tance [31][32] between probability distributions of ciphertexts
conditioned on a pair of plaintexts is examined as a security
measure for the indistinguishability, where the upper and lower
bounds on the TV distance are developed by the Hellinger
distance [31][32]. With the probability metrics, we examine
the success probability of an adversary to distinguish a pair of
potential plaintexts from a given ciphertext. By proving that
the success probability of any kind of attack is at most that of a
random guess, we demonstrate that the AG-OTS cryptosystem
can have the indistinguishability, as long as each plaintext has
constant energy. Therefore, the AG-OTS cryptosystem, if it
has a normalization step before encryption for equalizing the
plaintext energy, can be computationally secure.
Finally, we investigate how much the security of the AG-
OTS cryptosystem is sensitive to energy variation of plaintexts.
It is worth studying the energy sensitivity, since one might
need to assign unequal energy for plaintexts in the presence of
noise, depending on the reliability demands. As a consequence,
2we develop sufficient conditions on the minimum energy
ratio, the plaintext length, and the maximum plaintext-to-
noise power ratio, respectively, to achieve the asymptotic in-
distinguishability of the AG-OTS cryptosystem having unequal
plaintext energy. Since the analysis relies on the Gaussianity
of the sensing matrix, the results of the energy sensitivity can
also be applicable to the Gaussian one-time sensing (G-OTS)
cryptosystem in [17].
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
propose a new CS-based cryptosystem employing a secret
bipolar keystream, where the sensing matrix turns out to be
asymptotically Gaussian. Also, we discuss an LFSR-based
efficient keystream generation for the cryptosystem. Section III
introduces the indistinguishability along with the probability
metrics of total variation (TV) and Hellinger distances. For
security analysis, Section IV studies the indistinguishability
and the energy sensitivity of the new CS-based cryptosystem
in the presence of noise. Section V presents numerical results
to demonstrate the security of the new CS-based cryptosystem.
Finally, concluding remarks will be given in Section VI.
Notations: A matrix (or a vector) is represented by a bold-
face upper (or lower) case letter. UT and |U| denote the
transpose and the determinant of a matrix U, respectively.
U(k, t) is an entry of an M ×N matrix U in the kth row and
the tth column, where 0 ≤ k ≤ M − 1 and 0 ≤ t ≤ N − 1.
Also, U(k, :) denotes the kth row vector of U, while U(:, t)
is the tth column vector of U. diag(s) is a diagonal matrix
whose diagonal entries are from a vector s. An identity matrix
is denoted by I, where the dimension is determined in the
context.D denotes an N×N discrete-cosine transform (DCT)
matrix, where DDT = DTD = NI. For an N -dimensional
vector x = (x1, · · · , xN )T ∈ RN , the lp-norm of x is denoted
by ||x||p =
(∑N
k=1 |xk|p
) 1
p
, where 1 ≤ p < ∞. If the
context is clear, ||x|| denotes the l2-norm of x. A vector
n ∼ N (0, σ2I) is a Gaussian random vector with mean
0 = (0, · · · , 0)T and covariance σ2I. Finally, E[·] denotes
the average of a random vector or a random matrix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In [17], the authors presented the Gaussian one-time sensing
(G-OTS) cryptosystem, where a random Gaussian sensing ma-
trix is used only once for each encryption, and renewed for the
next. In information-theoretic sense, they showed that if each
plaintext has constant energy, the G-OTS cryptosystem can be
perfectly secure, which implies the indistinguishability [30]
that will be discussed in next section.
In practice, generating the Gaussian entries at each encryp-
tion may require high complexity and large memory for CS
encryption and decryption. For efficient implementation, this
section proposes a new CS-based cryptosystem in which the
sensing matrix employs a bipolar keystream.
A. Asymptotically Gaussian Sensing Matrices
Definition 1: Let U ∈ RN×N be a public unitary matrix,
i.e., UTU = UUT = NI, where each element of U has
the magnitude of O(1). Let S be a secret M × N matrix,
where we assume that each element takes ±1 independently
and uniformly at random. Then, a new CS-based cryptosystem
has the sensing matrix of
Φ =
1√
MN
SU.
Theoretically, each element of S can be taken from the
random Bernoulli distribution. In practice, however, we con-
sider a keystream generator of stream ciphers to generate
it in a fast and efficient manner. Employing an efficient
keystream generator allows us to construct and update S
at each encryption with low complexity and small memory.
Since a keystream for a stream cipher is designed to have
nice pseudorandomness properties [33], such as balance, large
period, low autocorrelation, large linear complexity, etc., we
assume that each entry of S from the keystream takes ±1
independently and uniformly at random, which facilitates
the reliability and security analysis of the new CS-based
cryptosystem.
Theorem 1: In Definition 1, the elements of Φ follow the
Gaussian distribution asymptotically for a sufficiently large N .
Proof : Each row of Φ is represented by
Φ(k, :) =
1√
MN
S(k, :)U
=
√
N
M
· 1√
N
diag(S(k, :))
U√
N
, k = 1, · · · ,M
(1)
where S(k, :) is the kth row vector of S, and 1 = (1, · · · , 1)
is all one row vector of length N , respectively. In (1), 1√
N
is a
row of a unit-norm row matrix with absolute magnitude of all
entries of O
(
1√
N
)
. Also, U√
N
is a unit-norm column matrix
with the maximum absolute magnitude of entries of o(1). With
the structure, Theorem III.1 of [34] shows that the elements of
Φ(k, :) are asymptotically Gaussian if N is sufficiently large,
which completes the proof. ✷
The asymptotic Gaussianity of Theorem 1 also holds if
the elements of S are generated by an efficient keystream
generator, under the assumption that each one takes ±1
independently and uniformly at random. The assumption will
be validated by the numerical results of Section V.
B. Keystream Generation
For the secret matrix S of Definition 1, we employ a
keystream generator based on a linear feedback shift register
(LFSR), to generate the elements in a fast and efficient manner.
As an example, we introduce the self-shrinking generator
(SSG) [35].
Definition 2: Assume that an L-stage LFSR generates a bi-
narym-sequence of a = (a0, a1, · · · ). With a clock-controlled
operation, the self-shrinking generator outputs bt = a2i+1 if
a2i = 1, and discards a2i+1 if a2i = 0. Then, we obtain a
bipolar keystream of s = (s0, s1, · · · ), where st = (−1)bt for
t = 0, 1, · · · , which will be arranged as the elements of S.
The SSG keystream generation requires a simple structure
of an L-stage LFSR along with a clock-controlled operator.
3Moreover, the SSG keystream possesses nice pseudorandom-
ness properties [33], such as balance, large period, and large
linear complexity. Meier and Staffelbach [35] showed that the
SSG keystream is balanced, and has the period of at least
2⌊L/2⌋ and the linear complexity of at least 2⌊L/2⌋−1, respec-
tively. Although the SSG keystream generator is considered
in this paper, any other LFSR-based keystream generator can
also be applied for the new CS-based cryptosystem.
When each element of S is obtained by a keystream gen-
erator, the initial seed (or state) of the generator is essentially
the key of the new CS-based cryptosystem. Therefore, the
key should be kept secret between a sender and a legitimate
recipient, while the structure of the keystream generator can
be publicly known.
C. AG-OTS Cryptosystem
From Definition 1, the new CS-based cryptosystem encrypts
a K-sparse plaintext x1 by producing a ciphertext y = Φx =
1√
MN
SUx, where S is updated at each encryption. Under the
presence of noise, a legitimate recipient and an adversary have
a noisy ciphertext r = Φx+n, where n ∼ N (0, σ2I). As Φ is
asymptotically Gaussian and S is updated at each encryption,
the new CS-based cryptosystem will be called the asymp-
totically Gaussian one-time sensing (AG-OTS) cryptosystem
throughout this paper. Table I summarizes the symmetric-key
AG-OTS cryptosystem proposed in this paper.
The reliability and stability of the AG-OTS cryptosystem
for a legitimate recipient is straightforward from the RIP
result [36] of a random Gaussian matrix, under the fact that
Φ is Gaussian for a sufficiently large N .
Proposition 1: [36] For a legitimate recipient, if N is suffi-
ciently large, the AG-OTS cryptosystem theoretically guaran-
tees a stable and robust CS decryption with bounded errors of
a K-sparse plaintext, as long as M = O (K log(N/K)).
III. SECURITY MEASURE
This section introduces a security measure of the indis-
tinguishability of a CS-based cryptosystem. To examine the
indistinguishability, we also discuss the probability metrics of
total variation (TV) and Hellinger distances.
A. Indistinguishability
Assume that a cryptosystem produces a ciphertext by en-
crypting one of two possible plaintexts of the same length.
Then, the cryptosystem is said to have the indistinguishabil-
ity [30], if no adversary can determine in polynomial time
which of the two plaintexts corresponds to the ciphertext, with
probability significantly better than that of a random guess. In
other words, if a cryptosystem has the indistinguishability, an
adversary is unable to learn any partial information of the
plaintext in polynomial time from a given ciphertext.
Table II describes the indistinguishability experiment [30]
in the presence of an eavesdropper, which will be used to
investigate the indistinguishability of a CS-based cryptosystem
in this paper.
1 In general, x can be K-sparse in an arbitrary orthonormal basis Ψ, i.e.,
x = Ψθ with ||θ||0 ≤ K , where Ψ 6= 1√
N
UT . For simplicity, we assume
Ψ = I in this paper.
B. Total Variation (TV) and Hellinger Distances
In this paper, we make use of the total variation (TV)
distance [31] to evaluate the performance of an adversary
in the indistinguishability experiment of Table II. In the
experiment, let dTV(p1, p2) be the TV distance between the
probability distributions p1 = Pr(r|x1) and p2 = Pr(r|x2).
Then, it is readily checked from [32] that the probability that
an adversary can successfully distinguish the plaintexts by any
kind of test D is bounded by
pd ≤ 1
2
+
dTV(p1, p2)
2
(2)
where dTV(p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, if dTV(p1, p2) is zero,
the probability of success is at most that of a random guess,
which leads to the indistinguishability [30].
Since computing dTV(p1, p2) directly is difficult [37], we
may employ an alternative distance metric to bound the TV
distance. In particular, the Hellinger distance [31], denoted by
dH(p1, p2), is useful by giving both upper and lower bounds
on the TV distance [38], i.e.,
d2H(p1, p2) ≤ dTV(p1, p2) ≤ dH(p1, p2)
√
2− d2H(p1, p2)
(3)
where dH(p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, if a ciphertext r con-
ditioned on xh, is a jointly Gaussian random vector with
zero mean and the covariance matrix Ch, where h = 1 and
2, the Hellinger distance between the multivariate Gaussian
distributions p1 and p2 is given by [39][40]
dH(p1, p2) =
√
1− |C1|
1
4 |C2| 14
|C3| 12
(4)
where C3 =
C1+C2
2 . For the formal definitions and properties
of the TV and the Hellinger distances, readers are referred to
[31], [32], and [37].
Throughout this paper, we use (2) − (4) to examine the
success probability of the indistinguishability experiment for
the AG-OTS cryptosystem, by taking the Gaussian distributed
ciphertexts into account.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we show that the AG-OTS cryptosystem
can be indistinguishable, as long as each plaintext has constant
energy. Moreover, we study how much the security of the AG-
OTS cryptosystem is sensitive to energy variation of plaintexts.
A. Indistinguishability
Recall the indistinguishability experiment of Table II. Given
a plaintext xh, E[r|xh] = E[Φ]xh + E[n] = 1√MNE[S] ·
Uxh = 0 from E[S] = 0, where h = 1 and 2. In the following,
Lemma 1 derives the covariance matrix of r conditioned on
xh, by exploiting the independency and the uniformity of the
entries of S.
Lemma 1: In the AG-OTS cryptosystem, the covariance
matrix of r conditioned on xh is given by
Ch = E[rr
T |xh] =
( ||xh||2
M
+ σ2
)
I (5)
4TABLE I
SYMMETRIC-KEY AG-OTS CRYPTOSYSTEM
Public: Unitary matrix U, Structure of a keystream generator
Secret: Initial seed k ∈ {0, 1}L of a keystream generator
Keystream generation: With the initial seed k, a keystream generator creates a bipolar keystream of length MN .
A secret matrix S ∈ {−1,+1}M×N is constructed by arranging the keystream, and
updated at each encryption by a new keystream.
CS encryption: With a plaintext x ∈ RN , a ciphertext is produced by y = Φx ∈ RM , where Φ = 1√
MN
SU.
CS decryption: Given a noisy ciphertext r = Φx+ n, the plaintext x is reconstructed by
a CS recovery algorithm with the knowledge of S.
TABLE II
INDISTINGUISHABILITY EXPERIMENT FOR A CS-BASED CRYPTOSYSTEM
Step 1: An adversary creates a pair of plaintexts x1 and x2 of the same length, and
submits them to a CS-based cryptosystem.
Step 2: The CS-based cryptosystem encrypts a plaintext xh by randomly selecting h ∈ {1, 2}, and
gives a noisy ciphertext r = Φxh + n back to the adversary.
Step 3: Given the ciphertext r, the adversary carries out a polynomial time test D : r→ h′ ∈ {1, 2},
to figure out the corresponding plaintext.
Decision: The adversary passes the experiment if h′ = h, or fails otherwise.
where h = 1 and 2. From (5), it is obvious that
C3 =
C1 +C2
2
=
( ||x1||2 + ||x2||2
2M
+ σ2
)
I.
Proof : Let x̂h = Uxh = (x̂h,1, · · · , x̂h,N )T for h = 1 and 2,
respectively, where ||x̂h||2 = N ||xh||2. Also, let sk = S(:, k)
and sl = S(:, l) are the kth and the lth column vectors of S,
respectively. Since the elements of S and n are independent
to each other,
Ch = E
[
1
MN
SUxh · xThUTST
xh]+ E[nnT ]
= E
[
1
MN
N∑
k=1
x̂h,ksk ·
N∑
l=1
x̂h,ls
T
l
xh]+ σ2I
=
1
MN
N∑
k=1
N∑
l=1
x̂h,kx̂h,lE
[
sks
T
l
]
+ σ2I
(6)
where
E
[
sks
T
l
]
=
{
I, if k = l,
0, if k 6= l
as the entries of sk and sl take ±1 independently and uni-
formly at random. Thus, (6) yields
Ch =
1
MN
(
N∑
k=1
x̂2h,k
)
· I+ σ2I
=
( ||xh||2
M
+ σ2
)
I
which completes the proof. ✷
In Lemma 1, note that the derivation of covariance matrices
does not rely on the asymptotic Gaussianity of Φ. Instead, the
covariance matrices are non-asymptotic results, obtained by
exploiting the independency and the uniformity of the elements
of S.
Using the covariance matrices of Lemma 1, we can develop
upper and lower bounds on the TV distance in the AG-OTS
cryptosystem, which is the main contribution of this paper.
Theorem 2: In the AG-OTS cryptosystem, assume that
the plaintext length N is sufficiently large such that Φ can
be asymptotically Gaussian by Theorem 1. In the indistin-
guishability experiment, let dTV(p1, p2) be the TV distance
between probability distributions of ciphertexts conditioned
on a pair of plaintexts in the AG-OTS cryptosystem. Let
xmin and xmax be the plaintexts that have the minimum and
maximum possible energies, respectively, where γ = ||xmin||
2
||xmax||2
is the minimum energy ratio and PNRmax =
||xmax||2
Mσ2 is the
maximum plaintext-to-noise power ratio, respectively, of the
cryptosystem. Then, the worst-case lower and upper bounds
on dTV(p1, p2) are given by
dTV,low = 1−
(
4γe
(γe + 1)2
)M
4
,
dTV,up =
√
1−
(
4γe
(γe + 1)2
)M
2
,
(7)
respectively, where
γe =
1 + γ · PNRmax
1 + PNRmax
. (8)
Proof : In the indistinguishability experiment of Table II, let us
consider a pair of plaintexts x1 and x2, where PNRh =
||xh||2
Mσ2
for h = 1 and 2. From the covariance matrices of Lemma 1,
|Ch| =
( ||xh||2
M
+ σ2
)M
= σ2M · (PNRh + 1)M
for each h. Obviously,
|C3| = σ2M ·
(
PNR1 + PNR2
2
+ 1
)M
.
5In (4),
Γ =
|C1| 14 · |C2| 14
|C3| 12
=
(
(PNR1 + 1)(PNR2 + 1)((
PNR1+PNR2
2
)
+ 1
)2
)M
4
=
(
4γe
(γe + 1)2
)M
4
where
γe =
1 + PNR1
1 + PNR2
=
1 + γ · PNR2
1 + PNR2
and γ = ||x1||
2
||x2||2 . With dH(p1, p2) =
√
1− Γ, (3) yields the
lower and upper bounds of the form of (7). Without loss of
generality, we may assume ||x1||2 ≤ ||x2||2, which yields
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. As the lower and upper bounds turn out to be
monotonically decreasing over γ ∈ [0, 1], we can redefine γ =
||xmin||2
||xmax||2 and γe =
1+γ·PNRmax
1+PNRmax
, 0 ≤ γe ≤ 1 with x1 =
xmin and x2 = xmax, to obtain the worst-case bounds, which
completes the proof. ✷
In (8), γe is a general definition of the energy ratio covering
noisy cases, which will be called the effective energy ratio
in this paper. For security analysis, we assume that both a
legitimate recipient and an adversary have the same energy
ratio γ and the same PNRmax in the AG-OTS cryptosystem.
Theorem 2 shows that the indistinguishability of the AG-
OTS cryptosystem depends on the ciphertext length M , the
minimum energy ratio γ, and the maximum plaintext-to-noise
ratio PNRmax, irrespective of the plaintext length N and
the sparsity K . In particular, if γ = γe = 1, the indistin-
guishability can be guaranteed for the AG-OTS cryptosystem,
regardless of M and PNRmax.
Corollary 1: If each plaintext has constant energy or γ = 1,
the AG-OTS cryptosystem has the indistinguishability, since
the success probability of the indistinguishability experiment is
at most 0.5 from (2), thanks to dTV(p1, p2) = 0 for dTV,low =
dTV,up = 0.
In the AG-OTS cryptosystem, Corollary 1 ensures that no
adversary can learn any partial information about the plaintext
from a given ciphertext, as long as each plaintext has constant
energy, which is also the case in the G-OTS cryptosystem
of [17]. To achieve the indistinguishability, therefore, a nor-
malization step for equalizing the plaintext energy is implicitly
required before CS encryption in the AG-OTS cryptosystem of
Table I. Since it also offers a practical benefit from the efficient
keystream generation, the AG-OTS cryptosystem can be a
promising option for information security, by guaranteeing
the indistinguishability, reliability, and efficiency in a CS
framework.
B. Energy Sensitivity
Theorem 2 implies that the indistinguishability of the AG-
OTS cryptosystem can be sensitive to the minimum energy ra-
tio γ. Figure 1 sketches the upper and lower bounds of (7) over
γ at PNRmax =∞ in the noiseless AG-OTS cryptosystem. It
indicates that the TV distance increases as γ gets away from
1. In particular, if M gets larger, the TV distance approaches
to 1 more quickly as γ decreases. Such a behavior of the TV
distance suggests that if γ is far less than 1, an adversary may
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Fig. 1. Upper and lower bounds on the TV distance over γ in the noiseless
AG-OTS cryptosystem.
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Fig. 2. Upper bounds on the TV distance over γ in the noisy AG-OTS
cryptosystem, where M = 64.
be able to detect a correct plaintext in the indistinguishability
experiment with a significantly high probability of success,
which implies that the AG-OTS cryptosystem may not be
indistinguishable.
In addition, Figure 2 shows the upper bounds of (7) over
γ for various PNRmax in the noisy AG-OTS cryptosystem,
whereM = 64. In the figure, the bounds are sensitive to γ for
each PNRmax, as in the noiseless case of Figure 1. Moreover,
the bound itself is smaller at less PNRmax, which implies that
an adversary may have a difficulty in distinguishing plaintexts
at low PNRmax, due to the low TV distance. As a result, it
appears that the security of the AG-OTS cryptosystem would
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Fig. 3. Minimum energy ratio required for the asymptotic indistinguishability
of the AG-OTS cryptosystem at PNRmax = 20 dB, where N = 512.
be more sensitive to the energy ratio γ at higher PNRmax.
In summary, the AG-OTS cryptosystem may not be able to
achieve the indistinguishability, unless each plaintext has con-
stant energy. In what follows, we study how much the security
of the AG-OTS cryptosystem is sensitive to energy variation
of plaintexts. It is worth studying the energy sensitivity, since
one might need to assign unequal energy for each plaintext in
the presence of noise, depending on the reliability demands.
Theorems 3 − 5 present sufficient conditions for the minimum
energy ratio γ, the plaintext length M , and the maximum
plaintext-to-noise ratio PNRmax, respectively, to guarantee the
asymptotic indistinguishability for the AG-OTS cryptosystem.
Theorem 3: When M and PNRmax are given, let ϕ = (1−
4ǫ2N)
− 2
M and γe,min = 2ϕ− 1− 2
√
ϕ(ϕ − 1), respectively. If
the minimum energy ratio γ satisfies
γ ≥ γe,min − (1 − γe,min) · PNR−1max , γmin, (9)
the success probability of the indistinguishability experiment
is pd ≤ 0.5 + ǫN , where ǫN vanishes as the plaintext length
N increases. In other words, the AG-OTS cryptosystem is
asymptotically indistinguishable for a sufficiently large N , as
long as γ ≥ γmin for given M and PNRmax.
Proof : When M is given, we have 4γe(γe+1)2 ≥
(
1− 4ǫ2N
) 2
M
from dTV,up ≤ 2ǫN . The inequality turns into γ2e − 2(2ϕ −
1)γe + 1 ≤ 0, which holds if γe ≥ γe,min, or equivalently if
γ ≥ γmin in (9). Consequently, if the sufficient condition of
(9) is met, the success probability of the indistinguishability
experiment is pd ≤ 0.5 + ǫN by (2), which completes the
proof. ✷
In Theorem 3, γmin is the minimum energy ratio required
for the asymptotic indistinguishability of the AG-OTS cryp-
tosystem. Figure 3 displays γmin over M in the AG-OTS
cryptosystem at PNRmax = 20 dB, where N = 512. In the
figure, γmin is sketched for various ǫN =
1
logN ,
1√
N
, logNN ,
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Fig. 4. Compression ratios for the asymptotic indistinguishability and the
reliability of the AG-OTS cryptosystem at PNRmax = 20 dB, where K = 8
and ǫN = 1/
√
N .
and 1N . The figure reveals that the minimum energy ratio
required for the asymptotic indistinguishability approaches
to 1 as the ciphertext length M increases. In particular, if
the AG-OTS cryptosystem allows larger energy variation for
plaintexts, the asymptotic indistinguishability can be achieved
at a lower rate over N .
Theorem 4: When γ and PNRmax are given, recall γe =
1+γ·PNRmax
1+PNRmax
. Let Cγe = log
4γe
(γe+1)2
≤ 0, where the equality
holds if and only if γ = 1. If the ciphertext length M satisfies
M ≤ 2
Cγe
log(1 − 4ǫ2N) , Mmax,
then pd ≤ 0.5 + ǫN , which implies that the AG-OTS cryp-
tosystem is asymptotically indistinguishable for a sufficiently
large N , as long as M ≤Mmax for given γ and PNRmax.
Proof : When γe is given from γ and PNRmax, the proof is
similar to that of Theorem 3 from dTV,up ≤ 2ǫN . ✷
Figure 4 depicts the maximum compression ratio ρmax =
Mmax
N over N for the AG-OTS cryptosystem to be asymp-
totically indistinguishable at PNRmax = 20 dB with pd ≤
0.5+ǫN , where ǫN =
1√
N
. We also sketch the minimum com-
pression ratio ρmin =
2K log(N/K)
N for reliable CS decryption
2
from a random Gaussian sensing [41] with K = 8, to compare
the requirements for the asymptotic indistinguishability and
the reliability. Note that if γ = 1 or the plaintexts have
constant energy, the indistinguishability can be achieved at any
compression ratio. Meanwhile, if γ < 1, the compression ratio
of the AG-OTS cryptosystem must be at most ρmax for the
asymptotic indistinguishability. In particular, if ρmax < ρmin,
the cryptosystem may not be valid at least in theory for
the corresponding N , since the indistinguishability cannot be
compatible with the reliability. Thus, Figure 4 shows that if
2This is a theoretical ratio in noiseless recovery.
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Fig. 5. Upper bounds on PNRmax for the asymptotic indistinguishability of
the AG-OTS cryptosystem, where N = 512 and ǫN = 1/
√
N .
γ = 0.98, the AG-OTS cryptosystem at PNRmax = 20 dB
can achieve both reliability and security for the plaintexts
of at most K = 8 nonzero entries only at the compression
ratios of the achievable (shaded) region. It also shows that
if γ ≤ 0.96, the AG-OTS cryptosystem has no theoretically
achievable region for N > 500, where the reliability and the
indistinguishability cannot be guaranteed simultaneously.
In (8), note that
γe = γ +
1− γ
1 + PNRmax
(10)
where γe ≥ γ for γ ∈ [0, 1]. Since the upper bound of (7)
is monotonically decreasing over γe ∈ [0, 1], (10) implies
that the upper bound on the TV distance is lower in noisy
case (PNRmax <∞) than in noiseless case (PNRmax =∞).
Ultimately, it points out that the presence of noise improves
the security of the AG-OTS cryptosystem by lowering the
success probability of an adversary in the indistinguishabil-
ity experiment. Moreover, one can increase γe by reducing
PNRmax in (10) for a given γ, which indicates that the AG-
OTS cryptosystem will be more secure for less PNRmax.
With given γ and M , Theorem 5 presents the largest possible
PNRmax to guarantee the asymptotic indistinguishability for
the AG-OTS cryptosystem, where the proof is straightforward
from γe ≥ γe,min in (10).
Theorem 5: In the AG-OTS cryptosystem, assume that the
minimum energy ratio is given as γ < γe,min for a given M ,
where γe,min is the minimum effective energy ratio defined in
Theorem 3. Then, the asymptotic indistinguishability can be
achieved for a sufficiently large N , if
PNRmax ≤ 1− γe,min
γe,min − γ .
Note that if γ ≥ γe,min, the AG-OTS cryptosystem is
asymptotically indistinguishable, regardless of PNRmax, due
to γe ≥ γ ≥ γe,min. Figure 5 displays the upper bounds
on PNRmax of Theorem 5 for various γ < γe,min, where
N = 512 and ǫN =
1√
N
. From (10), it is clear that if
PNRmax is sufficiently high, γe ≈ γ < γe,min from which
the asymptotic indistinguishability cannot be achieved from
Theorem 3. Figure 5 points out that we need to increase γe
by reducing PNRmax below the upper bound for each given γ,
to achieve the asymptotic indistinguishability of the AG-OTS
cryptosystem. However, it appears that the largest possible
PNRmax is relatively low for a reliable CS decryption. For
the AG-OTS cryptosystem, therefore, it is an important issue
to keep the energy variation of plaintexts as low as possible.
In conclusion, it turned out that the security of the AG-
OTS cryptosystem is highly sensitive to the energy ratio of
plaintexts. The indistinguishability can be achieved only if
all the plaintexts have equal and constant energy. Therefore,
if the AG-OTS cryptosystem is to be indistinguishable non-
asymptotically, it is essential that each plaintext should be
normalized before CS encryption to have constant energy.
By analyzing the energy sensitivity, we presented the suf-
ficient conditions of Theorems 3 − 5 for the asymptotic
indistinguishability of the AG-OTS cryptosystem with unequal
plaintext energy. However, we found that even the asymptotic
indistinguishability can be achieved only if the plaintexts have
low energy variation for most M , N , and PNRmax. As the
analysis technique utilizes the result of Theorem 2 based on
the Gaussianity of the sensing matrix, the energy sensitivity
of this paper can also be valid for the G-OTS cryptosystem,
which has never been discussed in [17].
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section presents numerical results to demonstrate the
indistinguishability and the energy sensitivity of the AG-OTS
cryptosystem. In numerical experiments, each plaintext x has
at most K nonzero entries, where the positions are chosen
uniformly at random and the coefficients are taken from the
Gaussian distribution. In CS encryption, Φ = 1√
MN
SU,
where U = D is the discrete cosine transform (DCT) matrix.
Each element of the secret matrix S is taken from a bipolar
keystream obtained by the self-shrinking generator (SSG) with
a 128-stage LFSR. For comparison, we test with S whose
elements are taken from the random Bernoulli distribution.
We assume that a ciphertext is available for both an adversary
and a legitimate recipient with the same PNR = ||x||
2
Mσ2 . For CS
decryption, the CoSaMP recovery algorithm [42] is employed
for a legitimate recipient to decrypt each ciphertext with the
knowledge of S. Meanwhile, we assume that an adversary
can attempt any kind of detection in polynomial time, to pass
the indistinguishability experiment by distinguishing a pair of
plaintexts from a given ciphertext.
Figure 6 displays the quantile-quantile (QQ) plots of the
entries of total 100 matrices of
√
MΦ in the AG-OTS cryp-
tosystem, where N = 512 and M = 64. In Figure 6(a), each
entry of S is taken from the random Bernoulli distribution
taking ±1 independently and uniformly at random, while S
of Figure 6(b) is from the bipolar SSG keystream. Since both
QQ-plots are linear with slope 1, it appears that the entries
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Fig. 6. Quantile-Quantile plots (QQ-plots) of the entries of total 100 matrices of
√
MΦ’s in the AG-OTS cryptosystem, where N = 512 and M = 64.
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Fig. 7. Covariance matrices of M · E[rrT |x] in the AG-OTS cryptosystem at PNR = 20 dB, where N = 512, M = 64, and K = 8. For a given x with
||x||2 = 1, total 10000 matrices of S have been tested for the average.
of
√
MΦ follow the normal distribution in both cases of S.
The figure gives a numerical evidence that Φ of the AG-
OTS cryptosystem is asymptotically Gaussian for a sufficiently
large N , even if S is generated in a pseudorandom fashion by
the SSG.
Figure 7 illustrates the covariance matrices of MC =
M · E[rrT |x] in the AG-OTS cryptosystem at PNR = 20
dB, where N = 512, M = 64, and K = 8. In the experiment,
total 10000 matrices of S have been tested for the average
with a given x of ||x||2 = 1. In the figure, the dark areas
indicate the off-diagonal entries of each covariance matrix
having very small magnitudes less than 0.04, whereas the
white cells represent the diagonal components of significant
values, determined by the plaintext energy and the noise
variance. Figure 7 numerically confirms that the covariance
analysis of Lemma 1 is valid for the AG-OTS cryptosystem,
whether S is a random Bernoulli matrix or a matrix from the
SSG keystream.
Figure 8 displays the upper and lower bounds of Theorem 2
on the TV distance over γ in the AG-OTS cryptosystem at
PNRmax = 20 dB, where N = 512, M = 64, and K = 8.
In the experiment, we computed the bounds of (3) using the
covariance matrices obtained by testing total 106 matrices of
S, where each entry of S is taken from the random Bernoulli
distribution or the SSG keystream. In both cases of S, the
figure shows that the bounds from the experiment are well
matched to the theoretical results of Theorem 2. In summary,
Figures 6−8 validate our assumption of the independency and
the uniformity of the elements of S from the SSG keystream
through the numerical experiments.
Figure 9 displays the success probabilities over the cipher-
text length M in the AG-OTS cryptosystem at PNRmax = 20
dB, where N = 512. For an adversary, it sketches the upper
bounds on the success probability of the indistinguishabil-
ity experiment, obtained by (2) from the upper bound of
Theorem 2. For comparison, we also sketch the empirical
success probabilities of a legitimate recipient, where we tested
total 10000 plaintexts each of which has at most K = 8
nonzero entries and the energy ||x||2 = α||xmax||2 with α
uniformly distributed in [γ, 1]. In CS encryption, each entry
90.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
γ
TV
 d
ist
an
ce
 
 
Upper bound (experiment): random Bernoulli
Lower bound (experiment): random Bernoulli
Upper bound (experiment): SSG
Lower bound (experiment): SSG
Upper bound (Theorem 2)
Lower bound (Theorem 2)
Fig. 8. Upper and lower bounds on TV distance over γ in the AG-OTS
cryptosystem at PNRmax = 20 dB, where N = 512, M = 64, and K = 8.
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Fig. 9. Success probabilities over M in the AG-OTS cryptosystem at
PNRmax = 20 dB, where N = 512. For an adversary, the upper bounds on
the success probability of the indistinguishability experiment are sketched.
of the secret matrix S is from the SSG keystream, where we
observed that the decryption performance is similar to that of
S from the random Bernoulli distribution. The CS decryption
is declared as a success if a decrypted plaintext x̂ achieves
||x−x̂||2
||x||2 < 10
−2. The figure shows that a legitimate recipient
enjoys a reliable and stable CS decryption for a sufficiently
large M at each γ. Meanwhile, the upper bounds on the
success probability of an adversary indicate that no detection
test can be successful in the indistinguishability experiment
with the probability more than the bounds. In particular, if
γ = 1, no adversary can learn any information about the
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Fig. 10. Success probabilities over PNRmax in the AG-OTS cryptosystem,
where N = 512 and M = 64. For an adversary, the upper bounds on the
success probability of the indistinguishability experiment are sketched.
plaintext with the success probability higher than 0.5, which
leads to the indistinguishability. However, if energy variation
occurs in plaintexts with γ < 1, the figure reveals that an
adversary may be able to distinguish the plaintexts in the
experiment, with the probability higher than 0.5. It also shows
that the success probability of an adversary becomes more
significant as the minimum energy ratio γ decreases and the
plaintext length M increases.
Figure 10 depicts the success probabilities over PNRmax
in the AG-OTS cryptosystem, where N = 512 and M = 64.
The simulation environment is identical to that of Figure 9. As
can be seen from the figure, the CS decryption performance
of a legitimate recipient improves over PNRmax. However,
the detection performance of an adversary is saturated at high
PNRmax, where the highest possible success probability is
determined by the minimum energy ratio γ. The figure also
shows that if PNRmax is low, the highest possible success
probability of an adversary is close to 0.5 for any γ, which im-
plies that the AG-OTS cryptosystem can be indistinguishable
at sufficiently low PNRmax, regardless of energy variation.
In this case, however, a legitimate recipient also fails in CS
decryption due to high noise level.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has proposed a new CS-based cryptosystem,
named as the AG-OTS cryptosystem, by employing a secret
bipolar keystream and a public unitary matrix for efficient
implementation in practice. We demonstrated that the elements
of the sensing matrix are asymptotically Gaussian for a
sufficiently large plaintext length, which guarantees a stable
and robust CS decryption for a legitimate recipient. By means
of the total variation (TV) and the Hellinger distances, we
showed that the AG-OTS cryptosystem can have the indis-
tinguishability against an adversary, as long as each plaintext
10
has constant energy. Therefore, it is essential that the AG-
OTS cryptosystem should have a normalization step before CS
encryption for equalizing the plaintext energy, which guaran-
tees the computational security against any kind of polynomial
time attack from an adversary. Finally, we found that the
indistinguishability of the AG-OTS cryptosystem is highly
sensitive to energy variation of plaintexts. To support the AG-
OTS cryptosystem with unequal plaintext energy, we devel-
oped sufficient conditions on the minimum energy ratio, the
plaintext length, and the maximum plaintext-to-noise power
ratio, respectively, for the asymptotic indistinguishability. The
results of the energy sensitivity can be directly applicable to
the G-OTS cryptosystem of [17].
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